Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 47 | Issue 4 Article 18
1957
Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes, 47 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 511 (1956-1957)
POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Warren L. Swanson and Roger Elchmeler*
Packages in the Mail are Protected from
Unlawful Search and Seizure by the Fourth
Amendment-Defendant was arrested and
charged with the unlawful possession of nar-
cotics and with depositing in the mail a poison-
composed of a large quantity of heroin. The
complaint was based on evidence obtained
through the opening by a postal employee,
under the direction of federal narcotics agents,
of a package placed in the mail by defendant
and addressed to her husband. The package,
sent air mail special delivery, was not sealed
with glue but was wrapped in paper and tied
with string. Inside the wrapping were two
envelopes, sealed with glue in the usual way
and found, upon opening and inspection, to
contain heroin. Thereafter the envelopes were
resealed by the postal employees with tape and
replaced in the package which was re-tied in
its original fashion and sent to its destination.
Subsequently, upon delivery of the package,
defendant and her husband were arrested by
narcotics agents.
In answer to the complaint, defendants filed
a motion to suppress the evidence found in the
package on the grounds that it was obtained
by an illegal search and seizure in violation of
the fourth amendment. The trial court denied
the motion to suppress and held that the search
involved in this case did not violate the fourth
amendment. United States v. Oliver, 140 F.
Supp. 808 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
However, the court stated that under other
circumstances the opening of packages and
letters in the mail may be unlawful. Packages
and letters which ire sealed with an adhesive
substance in such a manner as to evidence an
intention on the part of the sender that the
matter should not be opened are protected from
inspection without a search warrant by the
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fourth amendment. Relying on the rule set
forth in Ex Parie facksw, 96 U.S. 727 (1877),
the judge quoted Mr. Justice Field who said,
"Letters and sealed packages of this kind in
the mail are as fully guarded from examination
and inspection, except as to their outward form
and weight, as if they were retained by the
parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the
people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable search and seizures extends to
their papers, thus dosed against inspection,
wherever they may be."
Nevertheless, the court stated, to invoke the
protection of the fourth amendment, postal
regulations must be complied with. Thus, mail
sent under the lower rate classification and
bearing the legend "may be opened for postal
inspection if necessary" may be inspected
even though sealed with adhesive. Though
postal regulations provide that first class mail
may not be opened, such inspection will not
violate the fourth amendment unless the pack-
age is securely sealed. In the present case, the
postage was classified as first class matter, but
the judge concluded that tying a package with
twine does not fulfill the requirement that the
article be "securely sealed."
The court easily disposed of defendants'
contention that, even though the outside
wrapper was not sealed, the envelopes contained
therein were so secured and thus could not be
lawfully opened. "What may be contained in
the package," the court said, "is not a part of it
for the purpose of classification and the right
to open and inspect."
Statute Making Illegal the Possession
without Satisfactory Explanation of Tools
Which Could Reasonably Be Employed in
Crime Is Unconstitutional as Applied to Tools
Which Might Have Legitimate Uses--De-
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fendant was convicted of the possession of
implements in violation of a "burglary tool"
statute which provided, "no person shall
have in his possession, . . .any instrument,
tool or other implement for picking locks or
pockets, or that is usually employed, or
reasonably may be employed in the com-
mission of any crime, if he is unable satis-
factorily to account for the possession of the
implement."
Acting on a tip from an informer, police
arrested defendant in the hall outside his
apartment. Officers broke into the apartment
and a search revealed a length of knotted rope
and a revolver. Police then searched the
trunk of defendant's car parked outside and
recovered a bag containing a sledge hammer,
an axe, two wrecking bars, a length of knotted
rope, a brace and a bit. When asked for an
explanation of his possession of the tools,
defendant replied, "You know what they are
used for." The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, with one dissent,
reversed defendant's conviction and held the
statute unconstitutional as applied to imple-
ments which do not in themselves give rise
to sinister implications. Bent=c v. United
States, 232 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
The court construed the statute as requir-
ing, for its violation, that possession of the
tools be coupled with intent to use them for
an unlawful purpose. However, the statute
created a presumption of criminal intent from
a showing of possession without satisfactory
explanation. To rebut the presumed intent,
defendant must show that the implements
were not in his possession for a criminal
purpose. The majority could find no rational
inference of criminal intent from the mere
possession of tools which "reasonably may be
employed in unlawful activities. Though the
sledge hammer, axe, and hacksaw which
appellant had quite clearly can be used crimi-
nally, they also may be, and for the most
part are, used for legitimate purposes . . . In
contrast, such implications (of intent) prop-
erly arise from articles like opium or lottery
tickets which experience teaches are generally
held for illicit purposes."
In a later case, the same court held the
statute unconstitutional as applied to crow-
bars, allegedly used in a burglary. Washing-
ton v. United States, 232 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
Evidence Seized Illegally by Municipal
Officers is Not Inadmissible in a Federal
Court Because of General Co-operation
between Municipal and Federal Officials-
Chicago police officers, recognizing defendant
as a possible robbery suspect, halted defendant's
car and, without a search warrant, proceeded to
make a thorough search of the vehicTe. In the
trunk of the car the officers found a quantity of
heroin. Defendant was then delivered to the
Chicago narcotics squad which turned the case
over to federal narcotics agents for prosecution.
At the trial in a federal district court, defendant
objected to the admission into evidence of the
material seized without a warrant by Chicago
police. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and
approved the admission of the evidence.
United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.
1956).
Defendant had contended on appeal that
there was general co-operation between city
and federal narcotics agents in the exchange of
evidence and information. In arriving at its
decision the court analyzed the positions taken
by various federal courts and adopted the view
that co-operation between city and federal
officials will not render inadmissible in federal
courts evidence illegally seized by city officials
unless the search and seizure was a direct out-
come of the agreement. The degree of co-opera-
tion, the court concluded, must be such as to
have encouraged the unreasonable search.
In the present case the court recognized that
there was cooperation between city and federal
narcotics agents. The search and seizure,
however, was made by members of the Chicago
robbery detail in the course of a theft investiga-
tion. "The subsequent accidental discovery of
narcotics in the defendant's possession," the
court said, "had no causal relationship with
either the fact that the complaining party was a
federal officer or the practice of turning nar-
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cotics law violators over to the federal govern-
ment for prosecution." The court implied that
such evidence might have been inadmissible in
a federal court if it were secured illegally by
city narcotics agents pursuant to a narcotics
investigation.
Drunkometer Test Must be Administered by
an Expert and Results of the Test Must be
Supported by Expert Testimony-Defendant
was arrested on a charge of operating an
automobile while intoxicated and submitted to
a breath test for sobriety after he was warned
by the arresting officer that refusal to take the
test would result in the revocation of his
driver's license. The test was conducted by an
officer who had attended a school where the use
of the Harger Drunkometer was shown and had
used the device on various occaisions. At the
trial in a justice court, without a jury, the
officer described the method used in administer-
ing the test and related the changes in coloring
of the chemicils used. However, the officer was
unable to explain the nature or significance of
the chemical reactions involved and stated,
"All I have to do is match the colors and then
take a reading." The appellate court reversed
defendant's conviction and held that the results
of the Drunkometer test should have been
excluded by the trial judge. People v. Daddson,
152 N.Y.S. 2d 762 (Monroe County Ct. 1956).
The court easily disposed of defendant's
contention that he did not voluntarily consent
to the test but was coerced into taking it by the
officer's statement that defendant's driver's
license would otherwise be revoked. New York
law provides for revocation of a motorist's
license upon refusal to submit to a sobriety
test and the officer's statement, the court said,
"was a gratuitous offering of information as
to the provisions of the statute," and did not
render the test involuntary. However, the
officer who administered the test, the court
stated, was not shown to have the requisite
qualifications and no witness was called at the
trial who was able to explain the operation of
the machine or to verify that it was in good
working order. The court implied that the
person who conducts the test should have an
understanding of the chemical processes in-
volved and, in addition, it was said that "the
trier of facts ... is entitled to have a reasonable
explanation of the workings of some new or
strange device, before he is asked to accept
testimony of its end-result as competent proof of
a criminal act."
The court went on to criticize the use of the
name "Drunkometer" for the sobriety testing
device and indicated that where a case is
tried before a jury, the name might be preju-
dicial to the defendant. ". . . the very name of
the device," the court stated, "... might very
well be misinterpreted to mean that only those
who were 'drunk' or intoxicated were to be
tested by it;... the very name somehow lent
weight to the result which it produced."
Police Officer's Opinion as to Speed of Auto-
mobile Is Insufficient to Sustain Speeding
Conviction; the Accuracy of a Police Car's
Speedometer Must be Established by a Witness
who has Observed the Speedometer Tested-
Defendant was arrested for exceeding7 the
speed limit. At the trial in a justice court the
arresting officer testified that he docked
defendant's speed with the squad car's speed-
ometer. The accuracy of the speedometer was
attested to by the officer's statement that it had
been tested and found to be correct, presumably
by another officer. The appellate court reversed
defendant's conviction in the trial court on the
grounds that, in the absence of other competent
evidence, a police officer's opinion as to the
speed of the defendant's vehicle is not sufficient
to sustain a conviction. People v. Rothstein,
152 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Westchester County
Ct. 1956).
Since the arresting officer did not testify to
the accuracy of the squad car's speedometer
from his own knowledge, the court ruled that
such testimony should have been excluded.
"The police officer's testimony", the court
said, "is thereby reduced to a mere opinion as
to defendant's speed and may also be disre-
garded."
At a trial in another justice court of a similar
speeding charge, the arresting officer testified
that he clocked defendant's speed and further
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